The selection below is how Hitler both co-opted the Churches and persecuted them and dissident who priests who questioned the racist ideology of the Nazis. For reasons of space, it could not be included in That Line of Darkness: The Gothic from Lenin to bin Laden (Encompass Editions, 2013).
Not all dissidents that came under the surveillance
of the Gestapo were associated with political parties or journalists. Catholic
priests were also targeted, but because the regime was concerned about the
achieving public support, the Gestapo had to move cautiously. The visceral
loathing, with which several Nazi paladins held toward the Catholic Church
notwithstanding, a substantial part of the Church’s appeal to the National
Socialists was the Church’s portrayal of itself as a bastion of support against
the predatory encroachment of atheistic communism. The Catholic Center party,
which in 1919 had been the second largest party after the Social Democrats and
who during the Weimar years provided ten chancellors, frequently allied
themselves with the socialists in opposition to the rising Nazi party. As a
minority who had suffered persecution because German Protestants suspected that
their first loyalty belonged to Rome, the Church was relatively sensitive to
the plight of Jews whose patriotism was equally suspect.
Hitler was determined to co-opt and restrain the
Catholic Church with an adroit combination of conciliation and intimidation.
After he was given the reins of power, Hitler cleverly finessed the Catholic
Center Party by brokering a deal whereby if they supported his Enabling Bill
that assured him dictatorial power, he would guarantee them religious freedom
and control over their schools. With Communist deputies absent and the Catholic
party capitulating, only the Social Democrats voted against it despite the
extreme duress from storm troopers shouting, “Shut up!, Traitors!, You’ll be
strung up today” outside and inside the
Opera House, where the vote was taken owing to the fire damage to the
Reichstag. The bill easily passed, and its effect was to destroy parliamentary
government. With the support from the Catholic Party, Hitler in his radio
broadcast confidently assured his listeners that Christianity would be the
basis of the reconstruction of the country.
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Eugenio Pacelli: Pope Pius XII |
Hitler achieved an even greater coup de grace when
he negotiated a Concordat with Eugenio Pacelli, the Vatican Secretary of State,
(later to become Pope Pius ХΙΙ in 1939). In a controversial study partly
inspired by its provocative title, Hitler’s
Pope: Secret History of Pius X11, that suggests that Pacelli was a
collaborator of the Führer, John Cornwell argues that he was eager to flatter
and appease Hitler, an accommodation that grew out of bitter personal
experiences. As Papal Nuncio in Germany during the 1920s, he witnessed and even
encountered the nasty side of Bavarian Communism in 1919. As a result of a
traumatic event when Red Brigades violating diplomatic immunity broke into the
Munich nunciature, threatened him with guns and absconded with the limousine,
he was left with a searing memory that remained with him for the rest of his
life. Nursing an abiding hatred of Bolshevism, he associated it, according to
Cornwell, with Jews because they were prominent in that movement. Scholars have
criticized Cornwell for mistranslating the letter that Pacelli wrote to Rome
after the contretemps at the nunciature giving it an anti-Semitic tone and a
subsequent exchange with officials from this rogue government about assurances
regarding diplomatic immunity. Coupled with a Catholic anti-Judaic environment
that he grew up in Italy (and not repudiated until Vatican II in the middle
1960s), Cornwell maintains that the postwar experience stiffened his hostility
toward Jews that undoubtedly affected his later attitude during the 1940s when
he remained relatively silent about their extermination. Moreover, as a
believer in rigid hierarchies, he loathed the liberalism and parliamentary system
of the Weimar Republic. By contrast, Nazi Germany was the best bulwark against
Soviet expansionism. According to Cornwell, Pacelli exercised pressure on the
Catholic bishops to urge Catholic deputies to vote for the Enabling Bill and to
disband the Catholic Center party, and most problematically, he suggests that
had it not been for the Concordat, there would have been more resistance to
Hitler. Apart from its pure speculation, he underplays the Catholic Party’s
movement to the right before 1933. For example in May 1932, in violation of the
constitutional guarantee on gender equality, it sponsored a bill to dismiss
women if their husbands were already working. Exhausted by the political and
economic chaos, and angry by the ‘decadence’ that descended upon Germany, it
responded to Hitler’s promises of order, cultural purification and
denunciations of Communism and welcomed an authoritarian alternative. Cornwell
also ignores the loathing that Pacelli felt toward Hitler when the dictator
violated the terms of the Concordat. True, Pacelli demonstrated moral myopia in
his attitudes toward the Jews and refused to express objections to their
treatment during the 1930s, but then neither did the majority of Catholics in
Germany. Unlike his predecessor Pius XI, who wanted to abrogate the Concordat
but was persuaded to refrain by his successor, Pacelli, as pontiff, made no
attempt to cancel the treaty during the darkest period of Nazi persecution, a
gesture which would have been a compelling statement about the Papacy’s attitude
toward National Socialism. Captive to his anti-Communist sentiments, he could
not even share with leading German clerics the Papacy’s knowledge of the
extermination camps in Poland.
Regardless, the Concordat conferred in Hitler’s mind
Vatican recognition of his regime and support for his policies. According to
its terms, the Catholic party would disband and Catholics would cease
independent political action and the clergy would express their loyalty to the
Führer in return for the state’s assurance that Catholics would have control
over their education, church appointments and social activity. Hitler, not
surprisingly, had any intention of respecting the conditions of this treaty.
Unfortunately, Pacelli made a fatal error in failing to define political
activity since the Nazis defined virtually everything as political. They
proceeded to abrogate charity drives, religious holidays and Catholic
instruction in confessional schools and then the schools themselves, everything
that potentially could compete with their own agendas. Secondly, he failed to
address the security of baptized Jews or “non-Aryan Catholics” who had been
targeted by Nazi thugs, a concern that Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich, the
leading Catholic spiritual leader in Germany, raised with the papacy.
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Cardinal Micheal von Faulhaber |
Along with other prominent Catholic clergymen, Faulhaber
objected to the biological racism of Nazism because the Church had long defined
Judaism as a religion not a race, and the latter threatened its prerogatives of
determining who was and who was not a Catholic. Nonetheless, apart from a few
notable exceptions, the clergy, largely because of the Concordat, silently
accommodated themselves to the regime, even though the Nuremberg laws, and
especially, the pogrom in November 1938, privately upset many of them.
Historians disagree as to the degree that leading German Catholic officials regarded
the plight of professing Jews. Were they on their own or did they receive
support from a clergy who generally accepted "moderate" anti-Semitism in the
sense that Jews should not exercise influence disproportionate to their
numbers, but were appalled by the increasing violence meted out to them?
Complicating the dilemma was Faulhaber’s knowledge that National Socialism
harboured within its midst elements that despised Catholicism and would take
advantage of any excuse to combine “Jew baiting” with “Jesuit baiting” in order
to erode and possibly destroy the institutional authority of the Church in
Germany. In an attempt to straddle cautiously his Christian compassion with the
recognition that National Socialism had acquired its “power in a legal fashion,”
Faulhaber acknowledged that there could be a “community of blood,” but it
should not lead to "hatred of other peoples.” Throughout the 1930s, the regime considered him to be an adversary, in part because of his and Bishop Galen's vehement opposition to the euthanasia program. The
police confiscated and destroyed some of his sermons and subjected him to
physical harassment and verbal abuse. In the meantime, Hitler was confident (with
good reason because Catholics welcomed the signing of the Concordat and many
actually believed that Hitler was a devout Christian) and that he had the
Catholic Church and the vast majority of German Catholics on side for his “urgent
struggle against international Jewry.” As he privately said to one bishop in
April 1933 before the Concordat was signed in the summer: “The Catholic Church
considered the Jews pestilent for fifteen hundred years, put them in ghettoes,
etc.…. I am thereby doing a great service by pushing them out of schools and
public functions.” Of course, Hitler
made no distinction between their traditionalist anti-Judaism with its civic
inequality, deplorable as it was, and his brand of murderous racial
anti-Semitism.
Apart from
individual clergymen, who were mostly incensed by ham-handed efforts by the
Nazis to interfere in their religious affairs, the Protestant churches never
presented the same kind of challenge because they found it easier to
accommodate to the new Nazi rule. A substantial basis of their support emanated
from rural northern Protestants who not only welcomed a “community based on
blood,” but, unlike most Catholics, endorsed the eugenics program of the Nazis.
The Evangelical Church proclaimed its followers as “the storm troopers of Jesus
Christ” and predictably it preached a militant brand of anti-Semitism, male
chauvinism, and extreme nationalism.
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Priests give the Nazi salute |
Even more fanatical was the small German
Christian Church that repudiated the Judaic origins of Christianity and
excluded non-Aryan Christians (converted Jews) from being clergymen and joining
their congregations. They revised the image of Christ from being “a cowardly
sufferer” to a heroic warrior and “the greatest hater of Jews.” They vilified
other branches of Protestantism as “effeminate” and “soft,” while they extolled
motherhood, particularly those mothers that sacrificed everything for their
children. Meetings were held in pubs to accommodate the beer-guzzling
propensities of its macho parishioners. With unabashed anti-intellectualism,
the German Christian Church dismissed theology in part because of its misplaced
emphasis on sin, believing it a Jewish element that needed purging; trumping it
with an elevated rapture to a manhood that esteemed heroic soldiers would erase
the humiliating memory of wartime defeat. By politicizing the Protestant faith
out of recognition with its symbols and rituals—baptism became an
anti-Semitic celebration—it created an “anti-Jewish religion that echoed and
promoted Nazi genocide.”
The co-opting of the Churches and gradual assault on
Catholic associations coincided with the Gestapo’s harassment of individual
priests and ministers who presented a political challenge to the regime. Unlike
the Soviet Union where priests were routinely executed and churches destroyed,
the Gestapo attempted to use the law to drive a wedge between outspoken clergy
and the more compliant laity. It is true that thousands of clergy, mostly
Catholic but some Protestant, were subjected to the harassment of house
searches, surveillance and interrogation. But only the most obstreperous of
them served stints in prison and concentration camps. The first Roman Catholic priest to be sent to
a concentration camp was Josef Spieker who naively delivered a sermon in
October 1934 declaring that “Germany has only one Führer. That is Jesus Christ.”
The Gestapo arrested him, but, because he was a popular priest in largely
Catholic Cologne, sent him to trial, whereby he was acquitted, ostensibly for
insufficient evidence, but more likely because the three judges were
sympathetic to his being a priest. He was immediately rearrested, placed in
solitary confinement where he spent a grueling few months in a concentration
camp. Because he was a priest, he was subjected to special abuse that included
slithering on his belly to the filthy latrines. Retried in 1936, the same
judges who earlier had acquitted him convicted him for abuse of religious office
and sentenced him to fifteen months in prison, likely saving him from a much
worse fate. Upon his release, he was forced to leave Germany, and after a stint
in Holland, he fled to Chile, all the while feeling with some justification
that his Church had abandoned him. Spieker never fully grasped what the
scholar, Victor Klemperer, intuitively recognized; in a diary entry for April
10, 1938, the latter astutely noted that “the main thing for tyrannies of any
kind is the suppression of the urge to ask questions.”
By 1937, as a result of violations of the Concordat
by the Nazis, relations between the Catholic Church and the state became
acrimonious, particularly after Pius XΙ issued the critical encyclical “With
profound anxiety.” Without naming Hitler and National Socialism, the pope
condemned racism, neo-pagan doctrines and those who worshiped the idols of the
nation and state. Enraged by what he judged to be interference in the affairs
of state, Hitler ordered Goebbels to discredit the Catholic Church. He did this
by accelerating the campaign alleging that the Church protected pedophiles and
homosexuals in its midst. In a nationwide radio broadcast, Goebbels lambasted
the Church for being the “‘ulcer on the healthy body of Germany” for corrupting
German youth, a sufficient reason for eliminating the confessional schools. The
Gestapo used bribes and intimidation to secure charges of sexual molestation
and homosexuality, ensuring that newspaper coverage of these trials was
inundated with salacious details. Some convicted priests, who in some instances
were investigated by the Church itself and turned over to the Gestapo, were
guilty of the offences with which they had been charged. Their abuse of the
trust conferred on them served as a powerful Nazi propaganda weapon to smear the
Catholic Church. Few of the hapless priests who spent time in protective
custody, prison and concentration camps ever re-emerged.
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Nazi representation of a Catholic priest as a pedophile |
Faulhaber privately was more outspoken in his
criticism of Nazi intolerance toward Jews condemning it as “unchristian to
every Christian and ‘unjust and painful.” At the same time, like the vast
majority of Catholic and Protestant religious leaders, Faulhaber welcomed the
regime’s “purification” of public morals that had fallen into “hedonism” and
toleration of “smut” during the years of the Weimar Republic when sexually
active women on occasion resorted to abortion. He fully endorsed the Nazi
efforts to provide more "wholesome" entertainment to the public than nudity in
cabarets, the homosexual hangouts and visible commercialized sex.
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Dietrich Bonhoeffer |
There were clergymen who were more hostile to the
regime. Martin Niemöller and Dietrich Bonhoeffer are among the best known. Both
of them were products of the anti-Jewish religious milieu although Bonhoeffer,
because of both personal relationships and theological principles, increasingly
distanced himself from it. Niemöller initially supported the Third Reich as an
alternative to the democratic and secular Republic. But the increasing
infringement of the Nazis on religious affairs turned him into an outspoken
opponent whereby he spent seven years in concentration camps. At his trial, he
revealed his equivocal attitudes toward the Jews: although he found them
personally “unpleasant and alien,” he believed that they should be accepted
into the Church if they converted. The Bible did not permit the Church “to
replace baptism with a family tree.” The defiance of Bonhoeffer toward the
regime was even more unequivocal. Unlike Catholic leaders, whose contempt for the
modernism and individualism of the Republican era blinkered them to the dangers
posed by National Socialism, Bonhoeffer recognized before 1933 that “extreme
elements” were exploiting popular resentments, and that their goal was the “establishment
of a dictatorship.” With ideals incompatible with Christian beliefs, they would
repudiate what conservatives loathed, but with bigotry and violence, they would
also destroy every vestige of human dignity. That he made clear in a powerful
sermon in 1937 wherein he lamented that injustice was being inflicted on human
beings by the authorities that offered them only “pitiless and biased” words,
judging them “not according to justice but according to the status of the
person.” He was arrested in 1943 because of his links to the German resistance
and executed in April 1945 a month before the war ended.
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Most dissident clergymen were sent to Dachau |
Those that
died in the camps did so mainly during the war years. Although a number of
clergymen from Bishop Galen’s diocese were arrested and taken to Dachau where
some died as a response to his outspoken opposition to the euthanasia program,
most of the victims were among the seventeen hundred Polish clergy. Their
brutal confinement was not for any resistance, but they constituted part of the
intelligentsia that the Nazis sought to eliminate. It
would be unfair to use the advantages of hindsight to single out the church
leaders for not seeing the future of genocide, but there were plenty of warning
signs that contemporaries like the perceptive Bonhoeffer did recognize.
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